The Lagoon Page 48

  XCVII

  Honour teleology. For the definition of the body axes of animals and plants see Ch. XXXVIII. For the relative value of the poles see IA 5. SOLMSEN (1955), LENNOX (2001a) p. 275 and SEDLEY (2007) p. 172 discuss Platonic values in A.’s biology. Much of A.’s discussion about the genesis, position and structure of the heart is in PA III, 4–5, specifically PA 665b20; see LENNOX (2001a) pp. 254–65. On the symmetry of the liver and spleen: PA 666a25 and PA 669b13ff. Honour teleology also partly explains the existence of the diaphragm separating the lower, and less valuable, digestive organs from those in the thoracic cavity, in particular the heart, the centre of cognition, see PA 672b17. For a general discussion on honour teleology see GOTTHELF (2012) ch. 2.

  Humans v. animals. A. discusses the differentiation of body axes between humans and animals at HA 494a27 and differences in character at HA 588a19, HA 608a10 and HA 608b4. He claims that females are disabled, deviant, deformed or monstrous at GA 728a17 (females are infertile males), GA 737a22 (females are deformed males), GA 767b6 (females are the result of deviations in development from the kind, and in a way monstrous) and GA 775a15 (females are natural deformities). He explains the reason for having separate sexes at GA 732a1 and notes that females are needed for the perpetuation of form at GA 767b8; cf. GA 731b34, Metaph X, 9. The production of the sexes is, however, an ‘accidental’ feature – Metaph X, 9 – thus due to the informal system of inheritance. Eunuchs are said to be feminized at GA 716b5; cf. GA 766a26. MAYHEW (2004), HENRY (2007) and NIELSEN (2008) discuss whether A.’s theory of sex determination is sexist. The ‘scale of perfection’ interpretation given here is due to WITT (1998).

  Explaining human uniqueness. For the disproportionate production of seed in humans and its explanation, see HA 521a25, HA 572b30, HA 582b28, GA 728b14 and GA 776b26. I thank Tim Birkhead, University of Sheffield, for information about the relative volume of semen production in mammals. Humans and horses are said to have sex during pregnancy at HA 585a4. On the lechery of bald men see GA 783b27; cf. GA 774a34. On why women and eunuchs don’t go bald see HA 583b33, GA 728b15, GA 784a4–7 and LEROI (2010). A. discusses the peculiarities of human physiology at HA 521a2 and PA 669b1; the relationship between nudity and the use of hands as weapons at PA 687a22 and between human upright posture and divinity at PA 686a25, cf. PA 656a7; see LLOYD (1983) ch. I, 3, LENNOX (2001) pp. 317–18 and KULLMANN (2007) p. 690.

  XCVIII

  Political animals. A speaks of political activity among animals at Pol 1253a7, HA 488a10, cf. HA 589a3; see KULLMANN (1991) and DEPEW (1995). Crane sociality: HA 488a7, HA 614b18.

  The behaviour of bees. On single flower visitation and the waggle dance see HA 624b5; on the latter see also HALDANE (1955). On comb construction see HA 623b26; drone expulsion see HA 626a10; division of labour see HA 625b18 and HA 627a20; queen specialization see GA 760a11. Xenophon, Econ VII, tells how the queen rules the hive. A. is much less clear on the subject. At HA 488a10 he says that bees ‘live under a ruler’, but he gives no further specifics. He describes bee regicide at HA 625a17 and HA 625b15.

  The missing Habits of Animals. Most of A.’s ecological information is in HA VII and VIII (Balme’s numbering), the former focusing on their food and habitats, the latter on their habits and characters. Since the latter, which includes bee habits, is sometimes suspected of being un-Aristotelian, one explanation for the absence of a causal analysis of animal habits is simply that it’s not A.’s data. Most modern scholars, however, accept these books as being largely authentic.

  XCIX

  State formation. A. describes the origin of the household and state at Pol I, 1–2. He explains the purpose of the family household at Pol 1252b9 and argues for specialization at Pol 1252b1; cf. Ch. LI. The initial end of the state is said to be self-sufficiency, Pol 1253a1. The Cyclopes are said to be lawless at Pol 1252b35. See KULLMANN (1998) ch. V for the relationship between A.’s political thought and that of his successors.

  Natural slavery. A. gives his theory of natural slavery at Pol 1254a9ff. See Pol 1254b16, cf. Pol 1260a1, for the mental ability of natural slaves. Various commentators, e.g. HEATH (2008), have tried to refine exactly what mental capacity A. thought natural slaves lack. Setting the question of ownership aside: at Pol 1260a35, A. says that a free craftsman, working for a master, is in a restricted sense in a condition of slavery. A. muses on automatic lyres at Pol 1253b30. He suggests that barbarians make natural slaves at Pol 1256b20, cf. Pol 1252b5, Pol 1255a28 and Pol 1285a19; see HEATH (2008).

  C

  The cyborg state. Plato famously describes the Greeks clustering around the pond of the Mediterranean at Phaedo 109B. A. speaks of the state as having organs at Pol IV, 4 and compares its organs of central control to a soul at Pol 1254a28, Pol 1254a34, DA 410b10; cf. Pol 1253a20. The constitution is envisioned as a river at Pol 1276a35. The state is said to be a creation of nature at Pol I, 2, Pol 1263a1, but is in fact a natural–artificial hybrid, Pol 1265a29; see KULLMANN (1991) and LEUNISSEN (2013). Without the rule of law humans are the worst of animals, Pol 1253a29. For the classification of sciences see Metaph XI, 7. A. discusses the best state in Pol IV, 11 and Pol VII. For professional and property bars to citizenship see Pol 1328b35, Pol 1329a20. BURKHARDT (1872/1999) ch. 5 gives a particularly harsh and detailed assessment of fourth-century Athenian democracy, but A. also criticizes it in the Athenian Constitution; cf. Pol V, 5. A. classifies the organs of the state according to the distribution of their organs, Pol IV, 4. He describes the material causes for different kinds of states and constitutions at Pol 1321a5, Pol 1318b10; cf. Pol 1326a5 and the characters of Europeans, Asians and Greeks at Pol VII, 7. He speaks of the revolution and destruction of states at Pol V, 1, and inveighs against Plato’s marital communism at Pol II, 1–3 – even if his account of the scheme given in Rep is a bit of a caricature. He talks of natural order and living well at PA 656a5.

  CI

  Ecology and Metaphysics λ. The war between the eagle and the dragon snake is mentioned at HA 609a4; see WITTKOWER (1939) and RODRíGUEZ PéREZ (2011) for the origin and spread of this symbolic motif. Other references to the dragon snake are: HA 602b25 and HA 612a33. ‘We must consider also’: Metaph XII (λ) 1075a16 [trans. SEDLEY (1991)]. The three monographs and one paper that tackle this passage are JOHNSON (2005) ch. 9, SEDLEY (2007) ch. V, LEUNISSEN (2010a) and BODNáR (2005), but many others have too. The position on global teleology that I have adopted here is close to that of NUSSBAUM (1978) pp. 93–9, BODNáR (2005) and MATTHEN (2009). I thank István Bodnár for guidance here. See SCHMIDTT (1965) for the Renaissance trope of A. as a cuttlefish. For the origin of the term ‘ecology’ see HAECKEL (1866) vol. II, pp. 286–8 and STAUFFER (1957). The pinnophylax is said to inhabit the pinna at HA 547b16. For the biology of Pandora see SWIRE and LEROI (2010). A.’s discussion at DA I, 3, cf. DC II, 3, shows that A. thinks that there is no world soul.

  Ecological relations. The shark’s face, PA 696b25, cf. HA 591b25, has also been frequently discussed in terms of global teleology. LENNOX (2001a) pp. 341–2 considers the options for explaining this odd passage away, but admits it’s hard to do; see him for earlier references. A. speaks of the extraordinary fecundity of fish at HA 567a34 and mice at HA 580b10; of incontinent animals at EN 1149b30 and of the state of war that exists when food runs out, HA 608b19; cf. HA 610a12. At HA 610b2 he suggests that hostile fish will shoal together when there’s an abundance of food. Herodotus alludes to the balance of nature at Hist. III, 108–9 [RAWLINSON et al. (1858–60/1997)]; see EGERTON (1968), EGERTON (2001a) and EGERTON (2001b) for a cool look at ancient zoology and this idea. A. makes no use of this passage even though it crops up when H. is talking about his winged serpents, a passage that A. clearly knows. Besides Metaph XII (λ) 1075a16, Pol 1256b7 is the other major passage appealed to by supporters of global teleology. SEDLEY (1991), SEDLEY (2007) ch. 5 gives the strongest anthropocentric interpretation of this passage, but see JOHNSON (2005) ch. 9 for a rebuttal. A. speaks of prudent fishes at EN 1141a20. JOHNSON (
2005) ch. 8 effectively uses this passage to demolish an anthropocentric teleology, but fails to wonder how fishes can be prudent at all. An alternative reading, it’s true, is that fishes must be prudent for the sake of some direct, physiological benefit – and in the shark’s-face passage he mentions such benefits. But that does not seem to be what he’s getting at here, since he adds: ‘For the one observing each thing in relation to itself is prudent, and such things are entrusted to this one’ – trans. JOHNSON (2005). This is rather cryptic, but I suggest that it can be read as meaning that each kind is prudent about particular things (a man is prudent with money, a shark is prudent with sardines), indeed, that each kind has those things in trust, i.e. its nature binds it not to destroy the things it needs. QUARANTOTTO (2010) discusses wholes and their properties. See PIMM (1991) for a critique of the ‘balance of nature’ in modern ecology. ‘[Natural selection] does not plan for the future’ is from DAWKINS (1986) p. 5.

  CII

  The eternity of the cosmos. On the Pre-Socratics and the origin of the cosmos, DC 297b14. A. argues against the origin of change, Phys (VIII) 250b7, and gives a proof of eternal change, Phys 251a8; see GRAHAM (1999) pp. 41–4 for an analysis of this argument. In DC I, 10–13 A. gives another set of arguments, some of which are related to that given in Phys, others of which are linguistic. A. argues the need for a continuous source of change, Phys VIII, 5; see GRAHAM (1999) pp. 93–4 and BODNáR (Spring 2012). A. has no theory of inertia, see BALME (1939).

  Astronomy. On studying the stars, PA 644b22, DC 286a5, DC 291b24 and DC 292a14; see FALCON (2005) p. 99. A. defers to the experts in mathematical astronomy at Metaph 1073b10 and Metaph 1074a16; see LLOYD (1996) ch. 8 on A.’s relationship to the mathematical astronomers and a rather severe analysis of his own astronomical efforts. The geometrical model of the cosmos is sketched at Metaph XII (λ) 8; see LLOYD (1996) ch. 8. On Eudoxus see DL VIII, 86–91 and JAEGER (1948) ch. 1. A. gives estimates of the size of the Earth at DC 298b15. On the science of nature and bodies see DC 268a1; FALCON (2005) ch. 2. Saving the appearances v. explanation: Phys 193b22; LLOYD (1991) ch. 11, LEUNISSEN (2010a) ch. 5. A. asserts, on the basis of ancient astronomical records, that the cosmos is unvarying, DC 270b13, DC 292a7, cf. Metaph 342b9, LLOYD (1996) ch. 8. On the first element, aithēr, DC I, 2–3; FALCON (2005) p. 115 suggests that the traditional identification of the ‘first element’ with aithěr arose in later antiquity; for the reception and properties of aithēr, see FALCON (2005) ch. 3. The virtues of circular motion, DC I, 2; cf. Phys VIII, 9. A. discusses the final causes of circular movement of the celestial bodies: DC II, 3, DC II, 12; see LEUNISSEN (2010a) ch. 5.2.

  The celestial bodies are alive. A. explains why the stars do not have locomotor appendages at DC II, 8 – LEUNISSEN (2010a) ch. 5.4 – and compares them to ships in a stream at DC 291a11. A. claims that the stars (or spheres) are alive, DC 292a18 [trans. I. Bodnár], cf. DC 285a29; see GUTHRIE (1981) p. 256 text and note. On the properties of celestial life see DC 279a20, and on the celestial hierarchy, DC II, 12. On the motions of the sun and moon, DC II, 3. Here A. does not use the term ‘for the sake of’ and so it could be that the motions of the sun and the moon merely keep the sublunary elemental cycle going out of material necessity. At GC 336b1 he says that if coming to be and passing away (cycling of the elements) is to be continuous there must be some body (the sun) that moves with secondary motions. At GC 336b32 (see Ch. LXXX) he goes so far as to forget himself and talk of God who arranged the motions of the sun and the moon precisely to secure the greatest possible coherence to existence. LEUNISSEN (2010a) ch. 5.2, a stern opponent of global teleology when reading Metaph XII (λ), 10, concedes that conditional necessity and, by implication, global teleology are at work in DC II, 3: ‘Here, the use of the teleological principle allows A. to draw an organic picture of the cosmological system . . .’ There is an additional teleological argument for the relative perfection of the celestial bodies’ motions in DC II, 12. ‘A man and the sun . . .’: Phys 194b13, cf. Metaph XII (λ), 10; FALCON (2005) p. 9. A. argues against the materialist explanation (chance) for order in the cosmos, Phys 196a26. For Democritus on infinity see SEDLEY (2007) p. 138 who alludes to modern infinite-universe cosmological theory. Cosmological Selection Theory: see REES (1999) on fine-tuning, TEGMARK (2007) on multiverses in general and GARDNER and CONLON (2013) on CST and the Price equation.

  CIII

  Approaching God. The hallmarks of life reprised, DA 412a14. See Ch. LIII. A. justifies living celestial beings on religious grounds, DC 270b5; more generally for the religious motivation of A.’s cosmology see DC 270b5, cf. DC 278b14, DC 283b26; NUSSBAUM (1978) pp. 134ff. and FALCON (2005) p. 112. A. engages in religious archaeology at Metaph 1074b1. On the distinction between first and second philosophy see 1026a27, Metaph 1026a27 and GRENE (1998). For a specific denial that animals are truly self-movers see Phys 252b16, Phys 259b1, MA 2–5. GUTHRIE (1939) Introduction, GUTHRIE (1981) ch. 8 and SORABJI (1988) ch. 13 discuss the evidence for at least two, intertwined theories of cosmology, theology and physical motion in A.’s works. The problem is that UMs seem redundant as moving causes if the stars are already rotating because they are made of aithěr. Even so, it might be possible to construct a unified account of the UMs and celestial spheres made of aithēr if we allow that aithēr, like pneuma, is just part of a chain of moving causes; Bodnár (pers. comm.) points out to me that the UMs appear in the early, lost dialogue de Philosophia. A. lays out the argument for the unmoved movers at Metaph 1073a23, Phys VIII, 8–10. At Metaph 1073a1 he says there are fifty-five of them, but actually this is just one of several totals A. gives; another is forty-nine. He seems to be working, a bit ineptly, with several different models, LLOYD (1996) ch. 8. Considering A.’s mature theory of motion I have omitted most of that dark book, Physics VIII; see BODNáR (Spring 2012) for a crisp account of the theory, GRAHAM (1999) for a textual commentary and WATERLOW (1982) for a full analysis not much easier than A.’s text. A. does not have laws of motion: see DELBRüCK (1971), NUSSBAUM (1978) pp. 130, 305ff. A. discusses how the unmoved movers move the things they move: Metaph 1072a26, Phys VIII, 10. There is an apparent conflict between the claim that there are many UMs, Metaph 1074a14, and his usual focus on just one (e.g. throughout Phys VIII); GUTHRIE (1981) pp. 267–79, drawing on work by Philip Merlan, reconciles these passages by appealing to a hierarchy. A. lays out the nature of the ultimate UM at Metaph 1072b13ff. [trans. ROSS (1915)]; how God thinks at Metaph 1074b33. A. describes the best sort of life at EN X, 7. He quotes Anaxagoras at FR B18–19 (Protrepticus) and EE 1216a10.

  CIV

  The Lyceum and its texts. For a picture of life at the Lyceum see JAEGER (1948) chs 12, 13. The first of the opposed quotes is from DC 276a18; the second from GA 745b23. ANAGNOSTOPOULOS (2009b) gives an entry into the modern literature on A.’s development.

  CV

  Last days. The accusation against A. is related in DL V, 6–8 including the problematic hymn itself. A.’s will is given at DL V, 12–16; JAEGER (1948) p. 325 speaks of the Delphian honours. A.’s sayings and letters: ‘I will not allow the Athenians . . .’, FR F666R3; on regrets over revoked honours, FR F667R3; ‘The more alone . . .’, F668R3; JAEGER (1948) pp. 320–1. T.’s will is given at DL V, 51–7. Strab XIII, 1.54–5 describes the fate of the library; see BARNES (1995a), ANAGNOSTOPOULOS (2009b) for evaluations of the story. LENNOX (2001b) ch. 5 discusses the disappearance of biology. I thank William S. Morison, Grand Valley State University, for telling me about the archaeology of the Lyceum; see LYGOURI-TOLIA (2002) for the original excavation report.

  CVI

  Modern assessments of A. MEDAWAR and MEDAWAR (1985) pp. 26–7 has often been quoted by Aristotelian scholars as an example of stark insensibility.

  CVII

  The fate of A. in early modern times. For the Paris condemnations see GAUKROGER (2007) ch. 2 and GARBER (2000). For Thomist Aristotelianism see GAUKROGER (2007) ch. 2. BALME and GOTTHELF (2002) pp. 6–35 discuss the manuscript tradition of HA. GAUKROGER (
2007) ch. 3 discusses fifteenth-century counter-currents to Aristotelian scholasticism. Galileo’s debate is from his Dialogues on the Two Chief World Systems, Day 2, 1632.

  CVIII

  The fate of the biology. Albert Magnus’ quotes are from his de Miner., lib. II, tr. ii, I; de Veg., lib. VI, tr. ii, i. On Pomponazzi see PERFETTI (2000) ch. I, 1, GAUKROGER (2001) p. 92 and GAUKROGER (2007) ch. 3.

  CIX

  Francis Bacon. ‘And herein I cannot a little marvel’: Advancement of Learning (1605) bk. 2, cf. Cogitata et visa (1607); see GAUKROGER (2001) pp. 10ff. on scientific discourse. For Bacon on teleology see Advancement of Learning bk. 2; on forms Novum organum (1620) ch. 63 and JARDINE (1974) ch. 5. For Bacon on artificial science see GAUKROGER (2001) p. 39. Glanvill is quoted by MEDAWAR (1984) p. 95 for which see a general discussion of experiment and critique of A.’s method. GRENE and DEPEW (2004) ch. 2 and GAUKROGER (2007) ch. 9 discuss Descartes’ běte machine as given in his Discourse on Method (1637), V. Steno (1666) is quoted by GRENE and DEPEW (2004) p. 63.

  Vitalism. See Chs LV and LXVIII; CRICK (1967) inveighs against vitalism; SCHRöDINGER (1954/1996) ignores A.

  CX

  Experiment. Classical philosophers often refer to ‘experiment’ in the more general sense when talking about A.’s empirical investigations. LENNOX (Fall 2011), for example, refers to A.’s studies of chicken embryogenesis as an ‘experiment’. It’s not: it’s just a really nice observational study. HANKINSON (1995) refers to the wax vessel as an experiment – again, it’s not. LLOYD (1991) ch. 4 summarizes ancient Greek experiment, and views on it, but also doesn’t clearly distinguish between true experiments and various observations. See also LLOYD (1987) for the relationship of empirical data to theory in A. BUTTERFIELD (1957) ch. 5 tells the complicated story of Galileo and the cannonball.